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Abstract
This work takes a step towards investigating the benefits
of merging classical vision techniques with deep learning
models. Formally, we explore the effect of replacing the
first layers of neural network architectures with convolu-
tional layers that are based on Gabor filters with learnable
parameters. As a first result, we observe that architectures
utilizing Gabor filters as low-level kernels are capable of
preserving test set accuracy of deep convolutional networks.
Therefore, this architectural change exalts their capabili-
ties in extracting useful low-level features. Furthermore, we
observe that the architectures enhanced with Gabor layers
gain advantages in terms of robustness when compared to
the regular models. Additionally, the existence of a closed
mathematical expression for the Gabor kernels allows us
to develop an analytical expression for an upper bound to
the Lipschitz constant of the Gabor layer. This expression
allows us to propose a simple regularizer to enhance the ro-
bustness of the network. We conduct extensive experiments
with several architectures and datasets, and show the ben-
eficial effects that the introduction of Gabor layers has on
the robustness of deep convolutional networks.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has revolutionized several fields, from
computer vision [13] to machine learning [20] and natu-
ral language processing [14]. Outstanding gains in perfor-
mance were introduced after an era of saturation in perfor-
mance, particularly on computer vision tasks, where deep
neural networks (DNNs) have set new state-of-art base-
lines [17, 13]. However, despite this success, DNNs still
exhibit uncanny behaviors that are yet to be understood. In
particular, DNNs are highly susceptible to small perturba-
tions to their input, best known as adversarial attacks [12].
∗denotes equal contribution
Figure 1. Gabor layers and their effect on robustness. Top: Ga-
bor layers convolve each input channel with a set of Gabor kernels.
Analogous to low-level kernels, Gabor kernels present a natural
approach to represent local signals. Bottom: Replacing standard
convolutional layers with our Gabor layers imposes structure in
the distribution of singular values of the layer, reduces the Lips-
chitz constant of the layer (shown in the legend of the left figure),
and improves network robustness under adversarial attacks (right
figure). Results shown here are for VGG16 on CIFAR100.
That is to say, the accuracy of powerful DNNs on stan-
dard benchmarks can be drastically hindered in the presence
of perturbations that are imperceptible to the human visual
system. Even worse, it proves to be the case that the con-
struction of such adversaries is rather undemanding and, in
some cases, as simple as performing a single gradient ascent
step in the input space over a loss function [12]. The sim-
ple construction of adversarial examples has encouraged a
major interest in machine learning, as made evident by the
large corpus of methods that design powerful adversarial at-
tacks [12, 5, 28, 43]. This phenomenon is far-reaching and
widespread, and must be addressed particularly in scenar-
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ios where DNNs are employed in real world applications,
e.g., self driving cars [4, 8] and devices for the visually im-
paired. The risks that these degenerate behaviors pose have
made the training of not only accurate but also adversari-
ally robust networks of particular interest to the scientific
community. For instance, the work of [32] showed that, in-
stead of regular training, one can minimize the worst case
loss for each training instance under bounded perturbations,
a procedure now best known as “adversarial training”, for
the purpose of significantly enhancing robustness. Other
approaches have studied the relation between the existence
of adversarial attacks and the curvature of the loss func-
tion [27], and thereafter directly regularize such curvature
during training. Other works tackled the problem from a
functional perspective, where they regularize the Lipschitz
constant of the network as a way to reduce changes in the
output under small perturbations [9].
Such nuisances were not a major concern in the pre-
DNN era, as classical computer vision methods were struc-
tured and, generally, better understood compared to DNNs.
In many cases, these methods even exhibited rigorous sta-
bility under robustness analysis, too [11]. However, classi-
cal methods have been overshadowed by DNNs, mainly due
to the large performance gap on several tasks. It is precisely
in the frontier between classical computer vision and DNNs
that there has been a surge of works that aim to combine the
best of both worlds. In particular, it has been shown that a
combination of classical methods and DNNs can improve
performance and interpolate between the pros and cons of
both worlds. For instance, the works of [40, 46] showed that
introducing structured layers inspired by the classical com-
pressed sensing literature can outperform pure learning-
based DNNs. Another example is the work of [2], which
combined intuitions from the classical watershed transform
and DNNs to achieve large gains in performance in instance
segmentation. Convolutions in non-linear space were stud-
ied in [42] by exploiting the kernel trick, showing improved
convergence speed and accuracy.
In the pursuit of robustness in computer vision, the vi-
sual cortices of animals can be a source of inspiration, as
the survival of species strongly depends on the accuracy and
robustness of the animal visual system. Marr’s work [25],
along with Julesz’ [16], argues that the animal visual system
firstly processes low-level agnostic information, in which
the input of the system is segmented according to blobs,
edges, bars, curves and boundaries. Furthermore, Hubel
and Wiesel [15] demonstrated that individual cells on the
primary visual cortex respond to wave textures with differ-
ent angles in an animal model, providing evidence that sup-
ports Marr’s theory. Gabor filters [10] have come to be an-
other computer vision classic that found a way into DNNs,
precisely because these are mathematical functions that are
capable of modeling elements that resemble those that the
animal visual cortices respond to. Based on these facts, we
hypothesize that the introduction of Gabor filters in the first
layers of DNNs can improve the network’s robustness.
Gabor filters are structured kernels that have been used
for a variety of applications as texture characterization [16,
23], character recognition [39], edge detection [29] and face
recognition [19, 7]. Several works have examined their inte-
gration with DNNs. Among many works, Sarwar et al. [36]
improved the training speed of Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) by replacing their first layers with Gabor fil-
ters. However, none of the prior art investigated the use
of the parameterized Gabor filters in DNNs as an approach
to tackle the nuisance of adversarial attacks and robustness
in general. Our work fills this gap in the literature, where
we provide theoretical analysis of the Lipschitz constant
of parameterized Gabor layers and use this information to
demonstrate its impact on improving robustness.
Contributions: Our contributions can be summarized
in three folds. (1) We propose a parameterized Gabor-
structured convolutional layer for DNNs, and we derive an
upper bound to its Lipschitz constant as a function of the pa-
rameters of the underlying Gabor function. (2) We propose
a new regularizer on the parameters of the Gabor kernels,
based on the derived Lipschitz constant upper bound, to de-
crease the overall Lipschitz constant of the network which,
as a consequence, improves robustness. (3) We demon-
strate the effectiveness and generalization capabilities of our
proposed layer in improving robustness by conducting ex-
periments on several datasets (MNIST [21], SVHN [26],
CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [18], and ImageNet [35]) and archi-
tectures (LeNet [22], AlexNet [17], Wide-ResNet [45], and
VGG [38]). In particular, we empirically show that the sole
introduction of Gabor layers in DNNs enhances robustness
while maintaining performance. Moreover, we demonstrate
that by regularizing over the parameters of the Gabor filter,
guided by the Lipschitz constant of the Gabor layer, the ro-
bustness of the network improves furthermore. Our experi-
ments show a boost in accuracy under adversarial attacks of
up to 18% compared to models without the proposed Gabor
layer, while maintaining high accuracy in standard settings.
An overview of our method is displayed in Figure 1.
2. Related Work
Integrating Gabor filters with DNN. Extensive work
has been invested into leveraging Gabor filters with DNNs,
in the pursuit of diverse objectives. For instance, the work
of [36] replaced the first convolutional layers in CNNs with
Gabor filters to speed up the training. Moreover, [24]
showed the reduction in parameter count achieved by mod-
ulating the kernels of the first layers of several DNNs with
Gabor filters. Regarding large scale datasets, the work
of [1] demonstrated that the kernels of AlexNet’s first con-
volutional layer can be effectively replaced by Gabor ker-
Figure 2. Gabor layer operations. Our Gabor layer performs separable convolutions with ReLU non-linearities between a set K of
learnable Gabor filters and an input I ∈ Rm×h×w, producing a feature map fk ∈ Rm×h′×w′ per filter. All feature maps are then
concatenated in the channel dimension, producing a new feature map to which a 1× 1 convolution is applied to achieve the desired output
dimension n. Hence, our Gabor layer can be easily introduced into arbitrary network architectures.
nels, while recovering the standard test accuracy in Ima-
geNet [35]. Other works have integrated Gabor kernels with
DNNs for various applications as pedestrian detection [31],
object recognition [44] and hyper-spectral image classifica-
tion [6]. Last, but not least, large performance gains were
demonstrated in Chinese optical character recognition [47]
by integrating Gabor kernels with GoogLeNet. Likewise in
this work, we introduce Gabor kernels into various DNN
architectures through our proposed “Gabor layer”, in which
the kernels are generated by parameterized Gabor functions
that are learnt end-to-end with the rest of the DNN’s param-
eters. Nevertheless, the focus of our study is to explore the
role of Gabor layers in the overall robustness of the DNNs
in which these layers are introduced. Towards this goal, we
go a step further and exploit the existence of a closed-form
for the kernel-generating function, i.e., the Gabor function,
to conduct a theoretical analysis of the Lipschitz constant of
such layers, yielding results that allow us to propose a new
regularizer with the purpose of improving robustness.
Robustness of neural networks. Recent work has
demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial per-
turbations. This susceptibility has incited a surge in re-
search aiming towards developing not only accurate but also
robust DNNs. One simple yet effective approach is to aug-
ment the training data with adversarial attacks [12]. Like-
wise, [33] showed that distilling DNNs into smaller net-
works can also help in robustness. The work of Madry et
al. [32] showed that one can improve network robustness by
large margins by training on the worst case loss per sample
in a set of bounded perturbations. This work demonstrated
empirically that networks trained in this manner present im-
proved robustness against all first-order attacks. Closer to
our study is the work of Cisse et al. [9] on the Lipschitz
constant of DNNs. In particular, the work of [9] trains net-
works so as to incite that the Lipschitz constant per layer
is smaller than 1, resulting in an overall robust network. In
contrast to the prior art, our method follows an orthogonal
direction in the search for robustness, by exploring an ar-
chitectural modification through Gabor layers.
3. Methodology
In this section, we discuss our proposed Gabor layer and
we derive an upper-bound to the corresponding Lipschitz
constant for the purpose of network regularization. We
start by introducing the Gabor functions, which are defined
mathematically as follows:
Gθ(x
′, y′;σ, γ, λ, ψ) := e−σ
2 (x′2+γ2y′2) cos(λx′ + ψ)
x′ = x cos θ − y sin θ y′ = x sin θ + y cos θ.
(1)
3.1. Convolutional Gabor Kernel as a Layer
To construct a discrete Gabor kernel, one can discretize
x and y of Equation (1) uniformly on a grid, where the num-
ber of grid samples determines the kernel size. Given a
fixed set of parameters {σ, γ, λ, ψ}, a grid {(xi, yi)}k2i=1 of
size k × k, a rotation angle θj and a filter scale αj , com-
puting Equation (1) with a scale over the grid yields a sin-
gle surface αjGθj (x
′, y′;α, σ, γ, λ, ψ) ∈ R1×k×k, that we
interpret as a kernel for a convolutional layer. The learn-
able parameters [34] for such a layer are given by the set
P = {αj , σ, γ, λ, ψ;∀j = 1, . . . , r} where the rotations θj
are restricted to be r angles uniformly sampled from the in-
terval [0, 2pi]. This computation results in r rotated filters,
each with a scale αj defined by the set FP = {αjGθj}rj=1.
In this work, we consider several sets of learnable param-
eters P , say p of them, thus, the set of all Gabor kernels
(totaling to rp kernels) is given by K =
p⋃
i=1
FPi .
3.2. Implementation of the Gabor Layer
Given an input tensor I with m channels, I ∈ Rm×h×w,
similar to standard convolutions, Gabor layers follow a
separable-convolution based approach for convolving the
Gabor filters inK with I . In other words, I is first separated
intom individual channels where each channel is convolved
with each filter in K. The output is then passed through
a non-linear activation (ReLU). Formally, the Gabor layer
with filters in the set K operating on some input tensor I
can be presented asR = {ReLU(Ii ? fj), Ii ∈ I, fj ∈ K}
where Ii = I(i, :, :) ∈ R1×h×w and ? denotes the con-
volution operation. This operation produces |R| = mrp
responses. The responses are then stacked and convolved
with a 1× 1 kernel with n filters and thus the final response
is of size n× h′ × w′. See Figure 2 for a graphical guide.
3.3. Regularization
A popular approach towards improving robustness of
DNNs is to perform training that favors DNNs that enjoy
a small Lipschitz constant, i.e., a function f : Rn → R is
L-Lipschitz if ‖f(x) − f(y)‖ ≤ L‖x − y‖. This focus on
the Lipschitz constant is due to the fact that a DNN with a
small Lipschitz constant results in a decrease in the norm
of the backpropagated signal, improved computational sta-
bility [37], and therefore robustness to adversarial exam-
ples [9]. For instance, the work of Cisse et al. [9] shows that
an upper-bound to the Lipschitz constant of a network is the
product of the Lipschitz constants of each layer. Thereafter,
to train networks that are robust, [9] propose a regularizer
that incites the weights of the networks to be tight frames,
which are extensions of orthogonal matrices to non-square
matrices. The training procedure is, however, nontrivial
to implement. Along the lines of [9], we derive an upper
bound to the Lipschitz constant of our new proposed Gabor
layer as a function of its parameters. This upper-bound al-
lows for trivial network regularization of the parameters of
the Gabor layer that corresponds to the fastest decrease in
the Lipschitz constant of the Gabor layer. To this end, we
present our main theoretical result, that allows us to control
an upper bound to the Lipschitz constant of a Gabor layer.
Theorem 1. Given a Gabor kernelGθ(m,n;σ, γ, λ, ψ), an
upper bound to the Lipschitz constantL of the convolutional
layer that has Gθ as its kernel, with circular boundary con-
ditions for the convolution, is given by(
1 + |X ′|e−σ2m2∗
)(
1 + |Y ′|e−σ2γ2n2∗
)
,
whereX ′ = X\{0}, Y ′ = Y \{0},X = {xi}k2i=1 and Y =
{yi}k2i=1 are sets of sampled values of the rotated (x′, y′)
grid where {0} ∈ X,Y , m∗ = argminx∈X′ |x| and n∗ =
argminy∈Y ′ |y|.
Proof. To compute the Lipschitz constant of a convolu-
tional layer, one must compute the largest singular value
of the underlying convolutional matrix of the kernel. For
separable convolutions, this computation is equivalent to
the maximum magnitude of the 2D Discrete Fourier Trans-
form (DFT) of the Gabor kernel Gθ [37, 3]. Thus, the
Lipschitz constant of the convolutional layer is given as
L = maxu,v|DFT (Gθ(m,n;σ, γ, λ, ψ))| where DFT is the
2D DFT over the spatial dimensions m and n, and | · | is
the magnitude operator. Note that Gθ can be expressed as
a product of two functions that are independent of the sam-
pling sets X and Y as such
Gθ(m,n;σ, γ, λ, ψ) := e
−σ2m2 cos(λm+ ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(m;σ,λ,ψ)
e−σ
2γ2n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(n;σ,γ)
.
Thus, we have
L = max
u,v
|DFT (Gθ(m,n;σ, γ, ψ))|
= max
u,v
∣∣∣∣∣∑
m∈X
e−ωmumf(m;σ, λ, ψ)
∑
n∈Y
e−ωnvng(n;σ, γ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
u,v
∑
m∈X
|f(m;σ, λ, ψ)|
∑
n∈Y
|g(n;σ, γ)|.
Where ωm = j2pi|X| , ωn =
j2pi
|Y | and j
2 = −1. The last
inequality follows from Cauchy–Schwarz and the fact that
|e−ωum| = |e−ωvn| = 1. Note that since |g(n;σ, γ)| =
g(n;σ, γ), and |f(m;σ, λ, ψ)| ≤ e−σ2m2 we have that
L ≤
∑
m∈X
e−σ
2m2
∑
n∈Y
e−σ
2γ2n2
≤
(
1 + |X ′|e−σ2m2∗
)(
1 + |Y ′|e−σ2γ2n2∗
)
.
The last inequality follows by construction, since we
have {0} ∈ X,Y , i.e., the choice of uniform grid con-
tains the 0 element in both X and Y , regardless of the
orientation θ, where we define m∗ = argminx∈X′ |x|, and
n∗ = argminy∈Y ′ |y|.
Theorem 1 derives an upper bound to the Lipschitz con-
stant of the Gabor kernel as a function of the Gabor kernel
parameters. Note that the Lipschitz constant decreases ex-
ponentially fast with σ. In particular, as σ increases, Gθ
converges to a scaled Dirac-like surface. Hence, the upper
bound to the Lipschitz constant of a Gabor kernel is mini-
mized when the kernel resembles a Dirac-delta. Therefore,
to train DNNs with improved robustness, one can minimize
an upper bound to the Lipschitz constant derived on Theo-
rem 1. Note that the Lipschitz constant of the network can
be upper bounded by the product of Lipschitz constants of
individual layers. Thus, decreasing the upper bound of The-
orem 1 can help in decreasing the overall DNN Lipschitz
constant and thereafter improve robustness. To that end, we
propose the following simple loss regularizer
L = Lce − β σ2 (2)
where Lce is the typical cross-entropy loss and β > 0 is
a trade-off parameter. However, to avoid unbounded solu-
tions for β, we also propose the following loss
L =Lce − β (µ tanhσ)2 , (3)
where µ is a scaling constant for tanhσ. Next, we present
experimental results demonstrating the benefit of using Ga-
bor layers and the corresponding regularizer for robustness.
4. Experiments
To study the effects of introducing Gabor layers in
DNNs, we conduct extensive experiments on MNIST [21],
CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [18], SVHN [30], and ImageNet [35]
with LeNet [22], AlexNet [17], Wide-ResNet [45], and
VGG16 [38]. In each of these networks, we replace up to
the first three convolutional layers with Gabor layers, and
measure the impact of the Gabor layers in terms of (i) ac-
curacy, (ii) robustness, and (iii) the distribution of singular
values of the layers and the resulting upper bound to the
Lipschitz constant, as given by Theorem 1. In what follows,
we compare three types of architectures: standard archi-
tectures, architectures with Gabor layers and architectures
with Gabor layers trained with the regularizers proposed in
Equations (2) and (3).
4.1. Implementation details
All networks are trained with Stochastic Gradient De-
scent with weight decay of 5 × 10−4, momentum of 0.9
and batch size of 128. For MNIST, we train the networks
for 90 epochs with a starting learning rate of 10−2, which
is multiplied by a factor of 10−1 at epochs 30 and 60. For
the SVHN dataset, we train models for 160 epochs with a
starting learning rate of 10−2 that is multiplied by a fac-
tor of 10−1 at epochs 80 and 120. On CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100 the networks are trained for 300 epochs with a
starting learning rate of 10−2 that is multiplied by a factor
of 10−1 every 100 epochs. For experiments on ImageNet,
due to limitations in computational resources, the Gabor-
enhanced versions of VGG16 are fine tuned from ImageNet
pre-trained weights for 15 epochs with a learning rate of
10−4, where only the Gabor layers were learnt.
4.2. Robustness assessment
The robustness of DNNs is often defined as the percent-
age of instances of the test set for which the predictions of
the network under adversarial attacks are unchanged. Let
x be an input and C(x) be the prediction of a classifier
C at input x, then the sample xadv = x + η is an ad-
versary if the prediction of the classifier is modified, i.e.,
C(xadv) 6= C(x). Both η and xadv must adhere to con-
straints, namely: (i) the `p-norm of η must be bounded by
some , i.e., ‖η‖p ≤ , and (ii) xadv must lie in the space
of valid instances X , i.e., xadv ∈ X . Typically, in computer
vision, X = [0, 1]d, where d is the number of pixels in the
image, that is, every pixel is between 0 and 1.
A standard way of finding xadv for a given x is to start
from x and iteratively apply Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) [32]. For a given loss function L, one iteration of
PGD projects a step of the Fast Gradient Sign Method [12]
into the valid set of instances S, as given by the constraints
on η and xadv. Formally, one iteration of the PGD attack is
xk+1 =
∏
S
(
xk + δ sign
(∇xL(xk, y))) ,
where
∏
S x denotes the projection of x over S. In
the experiments, we consider PGD attacks where η is -
bounded in the `∞ sense with 10 random restarts and
200 iterations for each image. For MNIST we set  ∈
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}, while, for the rest of the datasets,  ∈
{2/255, 8/255, 16/255, 0.1}. We assess the robustness of a net-
work through its test accuracy and flip rate when the net-
work is subjected to PGD attacks. The flip rate is defined as
the percentage of images in which the attack is successful
in modifying the prediction of the network.
4.3. Training Gabor-enhanced Architectures
Even though the Gabor function strongly restricts the
space of patterns attainable by kernels within the Gabor
layer, we find that, given an architecture and a dataset, re-
covering close-to-nominal, and sometimes better, test set
accuracy is possible. Table 1 compares the nominal accu-
racies of various neural network architectures on different
datasets with the accuracies of the baselines when Gabor
layers are introduced.
Note that, as will be shown in the next sections, all the
models mentioned in Table 1 have robustness properties
and are able, nevertheless, to have close-to-nominal accura-
cies. Drops in performance are, nonetheless, expected when
aiming for robustness [41]. These results suggest that the
first few convolutional layers of various architectures can
be successfully replaced with Gabor layers without signifi-
cant drops in overall performance.
4.4. Singular values
Following [9], we report the singular values of the layers
in which we replace standard convolutional layers with Ga-
bor layers. Figure 3 shows box-plots of the distributions
of singular values for two architectures trained on three
Figure 3. Box-plot of the distribution of singular values. Left: MNIST with LeNet. Center: CIFAR100 with VGG. Right: ImageNet
with VGG. S: Standard; G: Gabor-enhanced; G+r: Gabor-enhanced with regularization. The top notch of each box-plot corresponds to the
maximum value of the distribution, i.e., the Lipschitz constant of the layer.
Table 1. Test set accuracies on different datasets of various
baselines, and their Gabor-enhanced versions. Baselines with
Gabor layers can recover close-to-nominal accuracies while pro-
viding robustness. ∆ displays the absolute difference between the
baselines and the Gabor-enhanced architectures.
Dataset-Architecture Baseline Gabor ∆
MNIST-LeNet 99.36 99.03 0.33
SVHN-WideResNet 96.62 96.78 0.16
SVHN-VGG16 96.52 96.18 0.34
CIFAR100-AlexNet 46.48 45.15 1.33
CIFAR10-VGG16 92.03 91.35 0.68
CIFAR100-VGG16 67.54 64.49 3.05
ImageNet-VGG16 71.28 68.90 2.38
datasets: LeNet on MNIST, and VGG16 on CIFAR100 and
ImageNet. Each figure shows the distribution of singular
values of the standard architecture (S), Gabor-enhanced ar-
chitectures (G), and Gabor-enhanced architectures with reg-
ularization (G+r), which are trained according to the regu-
larizer introduced in Equation (2). Results show that Gabor
layers tend to have smaller singular values that are also dis-
tributed in smaller ranges than their standard counterparts.
Additionally, in most cases, the Lipschitz constant of these
layers is smaller than that of standard convolutional layers.
Moreover, we find that training networks with Gabor lay-
ers with the regularizer introduced in Equation (2) produces
further reduction in the singular values of the Gabor lay-
ers, as shown Figure 3. For instance, in the left subfig-
ure, the sole introduction of a Gabor layer decreased the
interquartile range of the singular values, but was unable to
reduce the Lipschitz constant of the layer (the top notch of
the box-plot). However, the regularizer was able to abruptly
decrease the Lipschitz constant. For the rest of the exper-
iments, the regularizer is able to consistently decrease the
Lipschitz constant of the Gabor layer.
Since the Lipschitz constant of each Gabor layer plays a
vital role in the robustness of the whole network, the archi-
tectures that are enhanced with Gabor layers are generally
more robust to adversarial attacks. Moreover, training Ga-
bor architectures with the loss introduced in Equation (2)
boosts robustness, as it enhances further reduction in the
upper bound to the Lipschitz constant. Note that this gain
in robustness is not a consequence of any explicit training
against adversarial attacks: it is merely a result of the archi-
tecture of the Gabor layers. We conduct extensive experi-
ments to investigate the effect of these Gabor layers on the
robustness of different architectures and different datasets.
4.5. Robustness in Gabor-enhanced Architectures
After observing significant differences in the distribution
of singular values between standard convolutional layers
and Gabor layers, we now study the effect that introduc-
ing Gabor layers has in terms of robustness. We compare
robustness properties of different architectures trained on
various datasets when Gabor layers are introduced in the
first layers of each network. The modifications that we per-
formed on each architecture are:
• LeNet. We replace the first layer with a Gabor layer
with two families of filters.
• AlexNet. We replace the first layer with a Gabor layer
with seven families of kernels.
• WideResNet. We replace the first 2 layers with Gabor
layers with 3, and 1 families of kernels, respectively.
• VGG16. We replace the first three layers with Gabor
layers with 3, 1 and 3 families of kernels, respectively.
Table 2. Comparison between Gabor-enhanced architectures, and Standard architectures. Test set accuracies (top table) and flip rates
(bottom table) on MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet, of various baselines (LeNet, WideResNet, AlexNet, and VGG),
and their Gabor-enhanced versions, under adversarial attacks. S: Standard. G: Gabor-enhanced.* MNIST ’s are 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4.
Accuracy
MNIST-LN* SVHN-WR SVHN-VGG CIF10-VGG CIF100-AN CIF100-VGG ImageNet-VGG
 S G S G S G S G S G S G S G
0.0 99.22 99.03 96.62 96.78 96.52 96.18 92.03 91.35 46.48 45.15 67.54 64.49 71.20 68.90
2/255 80.04 80.58 40.27 48.61 57.86 62.88 34.22 37.6 15.08 14.77 27.22 31.12 - -
8/255 4.39 7.94 1.03 0.98 5.84 14.57 23.63 30.11 4.8 7.71 18.46 25.82 2.95 2.24
16/255 0.44 0.78 1.32 1.26 2.33 7.98 13.88 19.5 5.37 6.25 10.49 15.4 3.33 3.15
0.1 0.48 0.56 1.46 1.34 1.71 4.29 6.8 8.97 5.73 6.17 6.51 8.7 3.39 3.29
Flip Rate
 S G S G S G S G S G S G S G
2/255 19.53 18.88 57.21 49.00 39.53 34.11 60.03 56.42 56.88 49.73 57.05 50.94 - -
8/255 95.47 91.85 98.30 98.27 92.82 83.84 74.51 67.83 81.38 72.82 77.94 68.95 95.07 94.46
16/255 99.7 99.24 99.05 99.01 97.40 91.56 86.47 80.84 87.77 83.00 90.48 85.75 97.37 96.68
0.1 99.78 99.75 99.38 99.39 98.67 95.95 94.13 92.34 91.99 89.34 95.98 93.51 98.47 97.95
Figure 4. Effect of Gabor layers on VGG16 on CIFAR10. Left:
accuracy vs. attack strength (); right: flip rate vs. attack strength
for standard VGG and VGG with three Gabor layers with and
without the effect of regularization.
Figure 5. Effect of Gabor layers on VGG16 on CIFAR100. Left:
accuracy vs. attack strength (); right: flip rate vs. attack strength
for standard VGG and VGG with three Gabor layers with and
without the effect of regularization.
Table 2 compares the accuracies and flip rates of stan-
dard and Gabor-enhanced architectures under adversarial
attacks. In terms of accuracy, our Gabor-enhanced architec-
tures consistently outperform standard architectures across
datasets and architectures, and can provide up to a 9% mar-
gin. For instance, under a  = 8/255 attack, introducing a
Gabor layer can boost accuracy from 23.63 to 30.11 (27%
relative increment) for VGG16 on CIFAR10, or from 5.84
to 14.57 (149% relative increment) for VGG16 on SVHN.
Concerning flip rates, we observe that Gabor-enhanced
architectures consistently outperform the standard architec-
tures. That is, introducing Gabor layers consistently de-
creases flip rates in the datasets and architectures in which
we conducted experiments, for most attack-strength ()
regimes. For example, for  = 2/255, introducing Gabor
layers in LeNet reduces the flip rate from 19.53 to 18.88,
while this change is from 92.82 to 83.84 when introducing
Gabor layers in VGG16 on SVHN.
Due to limitations in computational resources, attacks on
VGG16 on ImageNet are conducted for all  values except
 = 2/255. For this setting, we also observe a decrease in flip
rate in all attack strength regimes: from 95.07%, 97.37%,
and 98.47% to 94.46%, 96.68%, and 97.95%, respectively.
Even though increased accuracy under attack is not ob-
served, we note that all accuracy values are particularly low
in the VGG16-ImageNet setting, and that the strength of the
attack appears to be of such magnitude that accuracy even
increases as the strength of the attack increases.
It is worthy to note that the significant increase in ro-
bustness we observe in the Gabor-enhanced networks came
solely from an architectural change we introduced: replac-
ing convolutional layers with Gabor layers, without there
being any other modification.
The above results demonstrate that (1) simply introduc-
ing Gabor kernels, in the form of Gabor layers, as low-level
feature extractors in DNNs has beneficial effects in robust-
ness, and (2) how these effects are consistent across datasets
and architectures. Inspired by these results, we know take
one step further by investigating the effect of adding the
proposed regularizer to the loss function.
Table 3. Comparison between Gabor Architectures, and Gabor Architectures with regularization. Test set accuracies (top table) and
flip rates (bottom table) on MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100 of Gabor-enhanced architectures (LeNet, AlexNet and VGG), and
their regularized versions, under adversarial attacks. G: Gabor. G+r: Gabor with regularization. * MNIST ’s are 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4.
Accuracy
MNIST-LeNet* SVHN-VGG CIFAR10-VGG CIFAR100-AN CIFAR100-VGG
 G G+r G G+r G G+r G G+r G G+r
0.0 99.03 98.69 96.18 95.93 91.35 91.19 45.15 45.07 64.49 64.52
2/255 80.58 88.42 62.88 64.03 37.6 38.07 14.77 14.68 31.12 31.68
8/255 7.94 22.69 14.57 15.99 30.11 30.69 7.71 7.88 25.82 26.64
16/255 0.78 0.76 7.98 8.88 19.5 19.93 6.25 6.67 15.4 16.06
0.1 0.56 0.82 4.29 4.88 8.97 9.5 6.17 6.43 8.7 9.09
Flip Rate
 G G+r G G+r G G+r G G+r G G+r
2/255 18.88 11.05 34.11 32.62 56.42 55.71 49.73 49.15 50.94 51.05
8/255 91.85 77.27 83.84 82.33 67.83 67.46 72.82 72.87 68.95 68.45
16/255 99.24 99.64 91.56 90.72 80.84 80.18 83.00 83.08 85.75 85.16
0.1 99.75 99.79 95.95 95.41 92.34 91.33 89.34 89.92 93.51 93.36
4.6. Regularization for improved robustness in
Gabor-enhanced architectures
Based on the closed form of the upper bound to the Lips-
chitz constant of the Gabor layer we developed in Theorem
1, we are able to introduce a regularizer into the loss func-
tion, as proposed in Equations (2) and (3), which allows
training to focus also on reducing the Lipschitz constant
of the layers. From Figure 3, we notice that Gabor archi-
tectures trained with such regularizers tend to have lower
singular values, and ultimately smaller Lipschitz constants.
These results imply that these architectures shall have better
robustness properties as a consequence.
For the purpose of exploring the effect that the regular-
izer has on robustness, we conduct experiments to study the
effect of the regularizer both in terms of robustness of the
network (accuracy and flip rate under adversarial attacks),
and the distribution of singular values of the modified lay-
ers (and hence, the upper bound to the Lipschitz constant
of such layers). For each experiment, we run training from
scratch following the same parameters from Subsection 4.1,
and including the regularizer in the loss. Table 3 summa-
rizes the results of our experiments in terms of accuracy and
flip rate. We observe that, in most cases, adding the regular-
izer improves both metrics. For instance, when applied on
LeNet in MNIST, the regularizer boosts accuracy by 8% and
14% for  = 2/255, 8/255, respectively. Regarding flip rate,
the regularizer is able to cause reduction by up to 14% over
the Gabor-enhanced architectures that are trained without
the regularizer. For LeNet trained on MNIST, the regular-
izer reduces the flip rate by 7%, 14% for  = 2/255, 8/255,
respectively. Figures 4 and 5 depict the test accuracy un-
der attack, and the flip rate for VGG16 on CIFAR100 and
CIFAR10 respectively.
It is noteworthy that, although the implementation of the
regularizer is trivial, optimization including the regularizer
is performed with the same number of epochs as if trained
using the standard cross entropy loss, while achieving de-
sirable robustness properties.
The results we present here are empirical evidence that
using closed expressions for kernel-generating functions in
convolutional layers can be successfully exploited for the
purpose of increasing robustness in DNNs.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we studied the effects of architectural
changes in convolutional neural networks in robustness. In
particular, we showed that introducing Gabor layers, an al-
ternative to standard convolutional layers, in which all ker-
nels are generated by a Gabor function whose parameters
are learnt, consistently improves the robustness of several
neural networks trained on different datasets when under
strong adversarial attacks. We also showed that the Lips-
chitz constant of the kernels in these Gabor layers is lower
than that of traditional kernels, which has been theoretically
and empirically shown to be beneficial to robustness. Fur-
thermore, theoretical analyses allows us to provide a closed
form expression for an upper bound to the Lipschitz con-
stant of Gabor kernels. We leverage the aforementioned ex-
pression to develop a regularizer in the pursuit of enhanced
robustness of the whole neural network. Finally, we con-
ducted extensive experiments with several architectures on
various datasets that demonstrated the effectiveness of Ga-
bor layers. We hope this work provides support to other
works studying architectural changes in neural networks for
improved robustness.
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